

INFORMATION REPORT

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Though somewhat outdated and in part overt, the following report is submitted because of its relevancy to the current international situation.

1. On 20 or 21 March a meeting of the SED Politburo took place which lasted several hours. The main topic of discussion was the development of the state structure of the Soviet zone. These talks were based in part on Otto Nuschke's report to Ambassador Semenov about his trip to western Germany, in which Nuschke gave a detailed account of his impressions and discussions. In consequence of this report, the eastern zone CDU had argued the idea that the constitution as adopted by the Volksrat (People's Council) was, considering new political developments in the western zones, not sufficient to satisfy the demands of western Germany in regard to a constitution for the whole of Germany. Actually, Nuschke's report had not been passed on to the SED directly from the originator, but the Politburo was informed of it through the Russians.
2. While the members of the meeting were convinced of the inevitability of a rejection of the Volksrat's invitation to western-German policy makers, and while it was frankly admitted at the meeting that this invitation was not the result of German initiative but of an SMA order which the SED obeyed only reluctantly, the participants in the meeting considered seriously what to do about the Soviet-approved suggestions of Nuschke and the CDU, now that the constitution had actually been adopted.
3. It was therefore established that, whenever mentioned in public, the present form of the constitution should be presented as a mere framework to which contributions coming from western Germany may still be added. Such talk should be directed as forcefully as possible towards the west even though preparations not only for the realization of the constitution but for the establishment of a government as well have entered the final stage.
4. There are no intentions of using SED representatives for such discussions with the West. On the contrary, it will be necessary to practice the utmost restraint whenever voicing an opinion, whether positive or negative, in regard to any kind of negotiations or individual approaches initiated by bourgeois groups in western Germany, no matter whether such groups act independently or under instructions. For instance, there are reasons to believe that

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it will be possible more and more to free the Nadelny discussions of the suspicion that they are Soviet-inspired. At present, the SED cannot but indicate a most reserved attitude in these matters, even though this will mean that others will get the credit for the initiative. Such an attitude will also be necessary when the time has come for the establishment of an administrative body for all Germany. In that case, care must be taken that the dominating influence of the SED does not become apparent. Future political moves will depend on the results of individual negotiations in western Germany. However, the most important task will be the complete isolation of the SPD leadership and of SPD political activities. All other political groups in western Germany contain personalities and elements who for various reasons desire and seek amalgamation with the east at any price. Among the most important tools for this purpose will be economic experts.

5. This latter idea was expounded by Walter Ulbricht. He argued that in many branches of western-German industry as well as in agriculture, there exists a growing desire to resume the east-west relations. Such tendencies must be supported at all costs, although this will at the same time mean the support of western German industrialists. This latter fact, however, will be unimportant in the light of the resulting political effect which will provide an opening for negotiations along the lines of the eastern policy. Naturally, the SED would not be the right agency for such approaches but it will still be necessary to support the attempt by practicing restraint in the anti-capitalist campaign against the west. The economic groups in the west are probably more important and more decisive than any of the political groups. Considering this, efforts must be made to make eastern-German industrial and commercial conditions appear more attractive than in the past. At this time, an economic crisis is developing in western Germany which has to be exploited to the utmost. For such purposes, men like Dr. Andreas Hermes should be dealt with by way of agricultural trade unions and similar organizations. The economic dependence of western and eastern Germany upon each other is, at present, the most effective factor in the attempt to interest western Germany in the eastern concept. Trade unions have a special task in this project and probably will do best by maintaining contact with related trade groups in the west.
6. As far as the purely political aspect of this scheme is concerned, the SED is practically out of the picture. Any overt political activity of this party in connection with contacts with Western Germany would only undermine the possibilities of exercising any influence.

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